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The last decades have witnessed an increasing prevalence of community resistance against large-scale infrastructure projects that pose serious
threats to their environment, calling for further empirical scrutiny. Hence, this paper applies a neo-institutional lens to investigate how project
actors who plan and implement large-scale infrastructure projects respond to community resistance in their attempt to legitimize and embed these
projects in their environment. To do so, we draw from a longitudinal study of two subway projects in Amsterdam; the East line (1965–1980) and
the North-South line (1995-2018). While considered crucial for urban development, both projects encountered severe community resistance by
locals protecting the historic city. This resistance, in turn, prompted ‘institutional work’ by project actors to socially (re)construct the projects in
pursuit of legitimacy from the Amsterdam community. The twofold contribution of the paper to the field of project studies is (1) the application of a
neo-institutional lens showcasing the dynamic interrelation between projects and their environment, processes of institutional transformation, and
practices of institutional work; and (2) the longitudinal empirical account exhibiting the contextual dialectic of resistance and accommodation with
an emphasis on shifting approaches of institutionalization, the constant struggle to acquire legitimacy, and the local embeddedness of projects.
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd, APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
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While large-scale infrastructure projects are important
mechanisms and symbols for modernization and urban
development (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Van Marrewijk,
2017), they can pose serious threats to external stakeholders in
their environment (Aaltonen and Kujala, 2010; Harvey and
Knox, 2015). These threats are not only structural, but can be
social, cultural, political, and ecological, catalyzing ‘self-
induced shocks’ (Grabher and Thiel, 2014) and resistance
from local communities (McAdam et al., 2010; McAdam,⁎ Corresponding author at: Organization Sciences, VU University Amster-
dam, De Boelelaan, 10811081, HV, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
E-mail address: a.h.van.marrewijk@vu.nl (A. van Marrewijk).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2018.07.003
0263-7863/00 © 2018 Elsevier Ltd, APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.2011; Teo and Loosemore, 2011; Teo and Loosemore, 2012;
Hanna et al., 2016; Di Maddaloni and Davis, 2018; Liu et al.,
2018). For example, the Dakota Access Pipeline project
recently made headline news as activists protested the project's
threat to the ecological environment and Native American
culture, leading to conflicts with local authorities (Whyte,
2017). Other projects never came into existence due to
resistance, such as the extension of the Stockholm rail
(Corvellec, 2001), an ambitious urban redevelopment and
railway project in Stuttgart (Novy and Peters, 2012) and the
construction of a new Mexico City airport (Dewey and Davis,
2013).
Indeed, McAdam (2011: 86) argued that while most
technical challenges encountered during the construction of
large-scale projects can be tackled, primary threats “now take
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conflicting institutional frameworks or from the reactive
mobilization […] opposed to construction.” The main implica-
tion is that projects are inter-institutional, involving various
actors from a complex and fragmented institutional environ-
ment who act according to diverse institutional frameworks,
prescribing particular interests, norms, rules, practices, as well
as time conceptions, belief systems, and cultural schemas (Dille
and Söderlund, 2011; Scott and Levitt, 2017). Hence, the
longstanding, technocratic perspective of projects as monolithic
constructions closed off from their environment has become
heavily criticized (Moulaert et al., 2003; Grabher, 2004; Van
Marrewijk, 2015), making way for the increasing acknowl-
edgement that “no project is an island” (Engwall, 2003: 789).
To better understand the complex relationship between a
project and its environment, project management scholars have
increasingly turned to institutional theory; particularly neo-
institutional theory (e.g. Holt, 2011; Sydow and Staber, 2002;
Scott, 2011; Dille and Söderlund, 2011; Morris and Geraldi,
2011; Aaltonen, 2013; Scott and Levitt, 2017; Biesenthal et al.,
2018). In project studies, neo-institutional theory underscores a
project's legitimacy, being its social acceptability and credibil-
ity (Scott, 2011; Scott and Levitt, 2017), and investigates how
project organizations seek to acquire legitimacy and support
from their wider social context to become feasible and locally
embedded (Manning, 2008; Aaltonen, 2013). Notwithstanding
the value of neo-institutional theory for project studies, the field
has not yet fully explored this theory as a conceptual lens (Scott
and Levitt, 2017; Geraldi and Söderlund, 2018; Biesenthal et
al., 2018). Moving beyond traditional institutional perspectives
providing a rationalistic and economic view of organizations
and their environment, with a focus on efficiency, control and
regulation, a neo-institutional lens provides a humanistic view
with an emphasis on social, cultural, and political dynamics in
the ongoing pursuit of organizational legitimacy (Powell and
DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995; Meyer and Rowan, 2006;
Greenwood et al., 2008; Scott, 2011).
Applying a neo-institutional lens, the aim of this paper is to
investigate how project actors, comprising administrators,
managers, and practitioners who plan and implement large-
scale infrastructure projects, attempt to gain legitimacy and
respond to community resistance in order to embed these
projects in their environment. Here, gaining legitimacy means
to sanction, authorize or justify a project with the purpose of
gaining public support and acceptance (Suddaby and
Greenwood, 2005), while community resistance is understood
as social opposition to the planning and/or implementation of a
project in its local environment (McAdam et al., 2010; McAdam,
2011). Given the increasing prevalence and impact of social
opposition and collective actions against large-scale infrastructure
projects (Teo and Loosemore, 2011; Teo and Loosemore, 2012;
Hanna et al., 2016), more empirical research is needed on
resistance of local communities in project studies (Liu et al., 2018),
which may help develop normative, cultural and/or inclusive
frameworks for stakeholder management (Di Maddaloni and
Davis, 2018), that “give communities a meaningful say in [project]
design and operation” (McAdam et al., 2010: 403).To fulfill our research aim, we draw from a longitudinal,
partly retrospective study of two large-scale infrastructure
project cases in Amsterdam to build two subway lines; the East
line (1960–1980) and the North-South line (1995–2018). While
both projects evidently served as important means for urban
renewal and development in Amsterdam, they were met with
fierce community resistance by residents and activists
‘protecting’ the historic city and monumental buildings. This
resistance, in turn, prompted various responses, practices and
strategies – i.e. institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2013) – of
project actors in their ongoing attempt to acquire legitimacy
and embed these projects into the Amsterdam community over
time. This research makes two contributions to the field of
projects studies. The first is the theoretical application of a neo-
institutional lens to shed light on the interrelation between
large-scale projects and their environment, processes of
institutional change and transformation, and practices of
institutional work. The second is our longitudinal empirical
investigation to delineate the contextual dialectic of resistance
and accommodation with an emphasis on shifting approaches
of institutionalization, the constant struggle to acquire legiti-
macy, and the local embeddedness of projects, as asked for by
scholars (McAdam, 2011; Scott et al., 2011; Scott and Levitt,
2017).
The paper is structured as follows. First, neo-institutional
theory will be introduced and succinctly reviewed, after which
the relevance of applying a neo-institutional lens in the field of
project management will be validated. Subsequently, the
qualitative research methods used in this study will be
explained and the choices that have been made in delimiting
the research field. Third, the findings will be shared addressing
the planning and implementation of the East line and the North-
South line, the resistance these projects triggered in the
Amsterdam community, and the responses, practices, and
strategies of project actors to gain legitimacy. Finally, in the
discussion and conclusion sections we share our analysis,
implications, and suggestions for future research.
2. A brief review of neo-institutional theory
In the field of organization science, neo-institutional theory
has been growing steadily over the past four decades,
generating an abundance of empirical research and theoretical
contributions (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1983;
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991;
Scott, 1995; Greenwood et al., 2002; Lawrence and Suddaby,
2006; Greenwood et al., 2008; Lawrence et al., 2013; Thornton
et al., 2015), potentially useful for project studies. Neo-
institutional theory emerged between the 1970s and 1990s as
a challenge to traditional rationalistic and economic concep-
tions of institutions (i.e. economic institutionalism) that
emphasized efficiency, compliance, control and regulation,
opting instead for a sociological and humanistic understanding
of institutions with an emphasis on social, cultural, and political
elements (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In the words of
Greenwood et al. (2008: 29): “Institutional theory evolved as
an antidote to the overly rationalist and technocratic
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forces within an institutional context.” Thus, a neo-institutional
approach rejects rationality to explain how organizations are
configured, and emphasizes legitimacy instead of efficiency to
account for organizational survival (Thornton et al., 2015).
Among neo-institutional theorists the meaning of ‘institu-
tion’ is debated (Greenwood et al., 2008). This is in part
because institutions can be conceptualized at various levels
being micro-level institutions of individuals, groups and
organizations that regulate behavior and interaction, like
codes of conduct or organizational protocol; field-level
institutions associated with professions, sectors and industries
such as established hierarchies of occupational status; and
society-level institutions concerned with democracy, family or
religion such as the values of a nuclear family or the laws
governing the rights of democratic citizens (Lawrence and
Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2008). Moreover, institu-
tions can be formal (e.g. enforced laws) or informal (e.g.
cultural traditions), and seen as having different elements that
can be more regulative (e.g. state policies and rules), normative
(e.g. norms and values) and/or cultural-cognitive (shared
meanings and frames of reference) (Scott, 1995; Greenwood
et al., 2008; Scott and Levitt, 2017). To organize and make
sense of these diverse analytical levels and elements, a more
inclusive description was articulated by Scott (1995: 33):
“Institutions are social structures that have attained a high
degree of resilience […] composed of cultural-cognitive,
normative, and regulative elements that […] provide
stability and meaning to social life […] are transmitted by
various types of carriers, including symbolic systems,
relational systems, routines, and artifacts [and] operate at
different levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to
localized interpersonal relationships. Institutions by defini-
tion connote stability but are subject to change processes,
both incremental and discontinuous.”
The main implication in organization studies is that institutions
are enduring elements in social life that significantly affect the
perceptions, practices, and interaction of organizational actors
within a particular organizational field or environment (Scott,
1995; Scott, 2001; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood
et al., 2008).
Besides defining institutions, neo-institutional theory in
organization studies has been more fundamentally concerned
with studying the organization in relation to its institutional
environment (Meyer and Scott, 1992), earlier conceptualized as
the “widespread social conceptions of appropriate organiza-
tional form and behavior” (Tolbert, 1985: 2). The main
objective of neo-institutionalists here is to gain insight into
how organizations seek legitimacy to survive so as to become
accepted and established in their environment (Deephouse and
Suchman, 2008: 7), theoretically referred to as ‘institutionali-
zation’; the process by which some conception, such as an
organization, practice, value or belief, becomes embedded in its
context (Sillince and Barker, 2012: 31). According to
Greenwood et al. (2008: 6), something becomesinstitutionalized when it emerges as legitimized, taken-for-
granted, widely accepted, and resilient to change, whereas
‘deinstitutionalization’ takes place when an established institu-
tion becomes rejected and delegitimized within its wider
institutional environment.
The relation between an organization and its environment
has been heavily debated for several decades by institutional
scholars questioning the extent to which organizations are
constrained by the institutional environment in which they are
situated (Tolbert, 1985; DiMaggio, 1988; Greenwood et al.,
2002; Greenwood et al., 2008). Early neo-institutional theory
(1970s – 1990s) mainly depicted organizations as passively
constrained by their institutional environment, which was ‘out
there’ enforcing rules, regulations, and requirements to which
organizations had to conform to survive (Greenwood et al.,
2008). Consequently, it was critiqued for overemphasizing
institutional determinism and the uniformity of organizations
becoming isomorphic (i.e. conforming) to demanding and
overbearing institutional environments while underplaying the
role of interest, agency, institutional change and processes, and
the varying organizational responses and practices to deal with
institutional pressures and dynamics (DiMaggio, 1988; Dacin
et al., 2002; Lounsbury and Boxenbaum, 2013; Suddaby et al.,
2013).
To address these shortcomings, neo-institutional scholars
began investigating new topics; organizational practices and
strategies to obtain ‘legitimacy’ (Suddaby and Greenwood,
2005; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Suddaby et al., 2013);
the conditions and processes of ‘institutional change’ and ‘(de)
institutionalization’ (Johnson, 2000; Greenwood et al., 2002;
Sillince and Barker, 2012); the varying ‘institutional logics’ (i.
e. socially constructed practices, values, beliefs, rules etc.)
across organizations, fields, and time periods that are often
conflictual, thereby providing the capacity for change
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Lounsbury and Boxenbaum,
2013; Thornton et al., 2015); and finally, the ‘institutional
work’ of purposive actors aiming to create, maintain, and
disrupt institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et
al., 2013). The theoretical significance of these topics lies in
their more critical engagement with and elaboration of the
interrelation between actors, organizations, and their intuitional
environment as dynamic, co-constitutive, contested, and prone
to change (Greenwood et al., 2008; Suddaby et al., 2013;
Lawrence et al., 2013; Zilber, 2013).
3. Applying a neo-institutional lens in the field of project
management
When we apply a neo-institutional lens to study the
interrelation between actors, projects, and their institutional
environment we see three significant insights that are relevant
for the field of project management. First, a neo-institutional
lens enables project scholars to deconstruct the dynamic and
recursive relation between a project organization and its
institutional environment (Sydow and Staber, 2002). Specifi-
cally, it invites scholars to investigate how projects are situated
as temporal, permeable organizational units in an institutional
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et al., 2011; Maaninen-Olsson and Müllern, 2009), and how the
institutional environment, in turn, is shaped by the plans,
purposes, and practices of project actors as they co-create
standards of what constitutes a legitimate and acceptable
project within a particular environment (Scott and Levitt,
2017). Accordingly, this gives insight into the inter-institutional
nature of large-scale infrastructure projects (Dille and
Söderlund, 2011), characterized by a complex network of
“multiple ‘authorities’ and ‘audiences’, varying legal jurisdic-
tions and agencies, diverse reference groups, and numerous
conflicting ‘stakeholders’ proffering alternative bases of
legitimation” (Scott, 2011: 60). In short, large-scale infrastruc-
ture projects are inextricably entangled with their institutional
environment, spanning institutional boundaries and encapsu-
lating diverse and conflicting institutional frameworks; a
phenomenon that requires further empirical and theoretical
investigation in the field of project management (Sydow and
Staber, 2002; Scott and Levitt, 2017).
Second, a neo-institutional perspective can help us gain
insight into how the dynamic interface between a project and its
environment can provide opportunities for institutional change
and transformation. The longstanding technocratic, instrumen-
tal, and/or economic approach to project management, aimed at
enhancing performance, efficiency, effectiveness, and cost-
benefit ratio over time, has proven largely incomplete and
unsuccessful (Engwall, 2003; Söderlund, 2004; Hodgson and
Cicmil, 2006), calling for a more humanistic, inclusive, and
environmentally considerate approach which neo-institutional-
ism can provide. A neo-institutional perspective informs us that
to gain legitimacy a project must not only conform to laws and
rules from a regulatory standpoint, but must also be equitable
and fair from a normative standpoint, as well as accepted and
supported by the affected community from a cultural standpoint
(Scott and Levitt, 2017). In a similar vein, though stakeholder
management has gained increasing attention in project studies
(e.g. Aaltonen and Kujala, 2010; Aaltonen, 2013), an
instrumental and economic approach focusing on sponsors,
suppliers, and customers has been dominant, requiring “a more
inclusive and holistic approach for engaging with a broader
range of stakeholders” (Di Maddaloni and Davis, 2018: 543).
Only recently have institutional theorists (Schneiberg and
Lounsbury, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2008; Lawrence et al.,
2013; Martí and Fernández, 2013) and project scholars
(McAdam, 2011; Teo and Loosemore, 2011; Hanna et al.,
2016; Di Maddaloni and Davis, 2018; Liu et al., 2018) begun to
address the role of local communities as important stakeholders
and how they influence organizational practices and processes,
and to theorize resistance and conflict as potential catalysts for
institutional change and transformation.
Third, a neo-institutional approach can help us zoom in on
the institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2013) project actors
carry out to acquire legitimacy, to mitigate the social impact of
a project on its environment, and to respond and/or accommo-
date to institutional pressures and conflicts, especially stem-
ming from threatened stakeholders such as local communities
who problematize or oppose construction (Grabher, 2002;McAdam, 2011; Scott and Levitt, 2017; Di Maddaloni and
Davis, 2018; Liu et al., 2018). Institutional work in the form of
responses, practices, and strategies of purposive project actors
is crucial for the institutionalization of large-scale infrastructure
projects, requiring improved stakeholder management, external
communication and consultation, public relations and partici-
pation, and more cooperative and inclusive approaches
(Aaltonen and Kujala, 2010; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008;
McAdam et al., 2010; Di Maddaloni and Davis, 2018).
According to Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), practices of
institutionalization are based more on the social skill of
organizational actors to construct accommodation with extant
cultural frameworks rather than to rely on the economic
performance or technical superiority of an organization.
Therefore, organizational actors must utilize symbolic practices
that attach new constructions or innovations to extant cultural
frameworks to persuade the relevant community of affected
actors to accept them. From this perspective, institutionalization
is essentially a political and strategic process transpiring
between authorities and audiences, involving symbols, myths,
ceremonies, hierarchies, and power dynamics (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1992; Brown, 1994;
Greenwood et al., 2008; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005;
Sillince and Barker, 2012). For example, the construction of the
Øresund Bridge, connecting Denmark and Sweden, used so-
called ‘cultural technologies’ such as ritualization, narration,
‘imagineering’ and aesthetization to legitimize the project and
constitute a transnational territory by integrating municipalities
and cultures (Löfgren, 2008). It follows that institutional work
comprises a repertoire of creative social and cultural strategies
(Sillince and Barker, 2012) that can be used to (re)shape the
relationship between a project and its institutional environment
(Meyer and Scott, 1992).
To encapsulate, we will apply a neo-institutional lens in the
field of project management to study the dynamic and co-
constitutive relation between large-scale infrastructure projects
and their environment, to shed light on institutional change and
transformation stemming from institutional conflicts and
pressures, and to show the institutional work of project actors
used to gain legitimacy and to embed a project in its
institutional environment.4. Methods of data collection and analysis
We use a qualitative–interpretive paradigm and a neo-
institutional lens to address social and cultural dynamics of two
large subway projects and their institutional environment in
Amsterdam. The interpretive paradigm assumes that “the social
world […] is local, temporally and historically situated, fluid,
context-specific, and shaped in conjunction with the re-
searcher” (Bailey, 2007: 53). Our research comprises two case
studies: The East line (1960–1980) and the North-South line
(1995–2018). According to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007),
case studies elaborate the rich, real-world context in which
phenomena occur, and facilitate theory building as unique
analyses emerge from identifying patterns in the dataset.
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project we solely carried out a retrospective study and
secondary document analysis of archival data, including
secondary interviews and news reports (Wiegman, 2006;
Cohen, 2008; Rosenberg and Berkhout, 2010; Smeets, 2012;
Schoonberg, 2013; Pen and Verkerk, 2015), photographs
(Stadsarchief, 1975; Westelaar, 1975), documentaries
(Hoeben, 1997; Polak, 2000; Cats, 2015), and academic
sources (Kaiser, 1976; Baart, 1977; Davids, 2000; Boelens,
2010; Mak, 2012; Verlaan, 2014; Langstraat and Switzer,
2015; Verstraete, 2016). For the North-South line, besides
carrying out a retrospective study and secondary document
analysis (e.g. Survey-Committee-North/Southline, 2007;
Berkhout and Rosenberg, 2008; Gemeentelijke-Ombudsman,
2009; Soetenhorst, 2011; NPO, 2016) akin to the former
project, we were also able to conduct intermittent qualitative
field research.
Between 2010 and 2014 participant-observation and in-
depth interviewing were executed in the North-South line
project. Participant-observation was carried out at various
events: the launch ceremony of the first phase (March 11,
2010), and the second phase (28 April 28, 2011) of tunnel
drilling, the incident of a tunnel leakage at the Vijzelgracht
(January 17, 2012), and the submergence of part of the tunnel
in the IJ waterway (September 25, 2012). Furthermore, we
attended underground project excursions with the technical
director (October 10, 2012), and with an employee (March 15,
2012), and two open-days on the annual ‘Day of Construction’
(June 2, 2012 and June 3, 2013), supplemented with regular
visits to the project organization's headquarters, the information
centre, and construction site look-out points set up throughout
the city for residents. As a resident of Amsterdam, the first
author kept up to date about the project's progress on the local
news, Facebook, Twitter, blogs and on the official project
websites https://www.amsterdam.nl/noordzuidlijn/, http://
wijnemenjemee.nl, and www.hierzijnwij.nu/live (the last airing
live camera footage of construction work).
Additionally, between 2006 and 2010, participant-obser-
vation was carried out at knowledge sharing platforms and a
community of practitioners for Dutch public project managers
where the second author was appointed the advisory role of
cultural expert and engaged scholar. Apart from participant-
observation, 10 in-depth interviews were held in Dutch with
diverse project actors of the North-South line: 5 communica-
tion advisors, 3 project constructors/contractors and 2 project
administrators. Interviews took approximately 1 to 2 h, and
were transcribed, translated to English, and coded for
analysis.
The analysis of our data was guided by our aim: to apply a
neo-institutional perspective focusing on the interface between
the planning and implementation of large-scale infrastructure
projects, the reactive resistance catalysed in the affected
community, and the responses, practices, and strategies of
project actors to gain legitimacy and embed these projects in
their environment over time. Consequently, the collected data
from the East line and North-South line was structured and
coded according to our four themes of interest: (1) projectplanning, (2) project implementation, (3) community resistance
and (4) project responses, practices and strategies (see Table 1
for a summary of these themes and corresponding data on p.
23). This enabled us to chart the development of each project
over time and to compare and contrast the two project cases for
patterns of institutional dynamics; especially concerning
institutional conflicts, change and transformation.5. Planning and implementing the East line for urban
development
In 1965, the Dutch government and Amsterdam municipal-
ity planned to build a metro through the east of the city, called
the East line. Administrators assumed that the East line project
would be technically and socially less complex than construct-
ing the North-South line which was initially planned first in the
early 1960s. Both metro projects were part of a much grander
urban renewal plan to establish more business venues and
prospects in the city centre, to move residencies to quieter
neighbourhoods surrounding the centre, and enhance the
transport system between the centre and these suburban areas
via the metro lines and a new highway, so citizens could easily
travel back and forth (Polak, 2000; Pen and Verkerk, 2015).
To the dismay of many residents, the East line would pass
under the historic neighbourhood the ‘Nieuwmarkt’ on its way
to the east; a monumental market square in the heart of
Amsterdam just south of Central Station. This plan triggered a
lot of social unrest among the Amsterdam community, which
was known for its liberal and left-wing political standing and
became wary of the implications it might have for the
Nieuwmarkt neighbourhood and the city structure at large. As
one former protestor said, “the [metro] plans were used to
transform the entire structure of the city” (Cats, 2015). Though
this social unrest was voiced by the community, even before the
East line was implemented, at this time administrators and
project developers were relentless in their urban renewal plans.
Reflecting on this time period in Amsterdam, and on urban
renewal plans in the Netherlands more broadly, Verlaan (2014:
178), argues that:
According to modernist planning doctrines […] civil
servants and municipal administrators worked until the late
1970s on drastic urban renewal plans in which demolition
and traffic breakthroughs prevailed [and in which] there was
little room for the opinion and participation of the
community.
Similarly, Boelens (2010: 4) claims that many infrastructure
projects during this time, including the East line, were criticized
because of their “esoteric, non-democratic decision-making in
back rooms, and a sort of ‘hit-and-run’ mentality of project
developers, aimed at short term (economic) effect and not on
sustainable (societal) gain.” With this approach, dominated by
authoritative public administrators and technically oriented
engineers, the East line was implemented (Langstraat and
Switzer, 2015).
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Because the technology for tunnel boring in soft subsoil was
not yet available, the East line project implementers would first
build the 3.5-kilometre tunnel tube and then sink chunks of it
underground via colossal concrete caissons, called the ‘caisson-
method’. Unfortunately, this meant that a substantial part of the
Nieuwmarkt neighbourhood would be evacuated and
demolished (Soetenhorst, 2011). When the demolitions com-
menced, many residents were unwilling to leave and the public
responded with major protests going on for weeks, comprised
of threatened residents, squatters, artists, architects, journalists,
and academics who strongly rebelled against the metro project,
and large-scale urban renewal plans more generally, portraying
themselves as ‘monument protectors’ (Soetenhorst, 2011;
Verstraete, 2016; Verlaan, 2014). They mobilized in the form
of social movement organizations such as the ‘Action-Group
Nieuwmarkt’ and ‘the Strong Arm’ and marched on the streets
in the city centre, chanting and holding banners saying, “stop
the demolition!” “protect the heart of Amsterdam!” and the
more popular slogan “geen buizen, maar huizen!” translated as
“no (metro) tunnels but homes!” (Hoeben, 1997; Cats, 2015).
The resistance against the Nieuwmarkt demolition and metro
project was not only a local issue for the neighbourhood and
Amsterdam, but it also became a national issue, fuelled by the
media which problematized large-scale and societally invasive
technological development (Cats, 2015).
Resistors legitimized their protests with arguments for
remaining in and preserving their historic neighbourhoods like
the Nieuwmarkt, and for providing cheaper housing and better
social-cultural facilities for the extant community, rather than
building for the sake of transport, business, and marketing
(Verlaan, 2014; Boelens, 2010). One former protestor ex-
plained that: “our most important points of protest were: the
high costs of the metro, the demolition of the city and the
neglecting of residents” (http://wijnemenjemee.nl/nieuws vis-
ited 27-03-2017). The main institutional conflict between
administrators and resistors of the East line was that the formerPhoto 1. Water cannons during Nieuwmalobbied for modernization and a stricter separation between
living, working, and consuming, whereas the latter wanted
these elements to remain integrated and protected from drastic
urban renewal plans. The East line therefore became a symbol
for a societal separation that the majority of the Amsterdam
community did not want (Kaiser, 1976; Cats, 2015). Therefore,
the tension between business and modernization on one hand
and culture and preservation on the other became an important
struggle that formed the basis of the institutional conflict that
emerged during the implementation of the East line (Boelens,
2010).
The more peaceful protests, which were left unanswered and
unaccommodated, quickly developed into violent ones, partic-
ularly during the infamous ‘Nieuwmarkt riots’ more generally
known as the ‘metro riots’ on March 24 and April 8, 1975.
These riots were so fierce that the Dutch government mobilized
Military Police who used bats, teargas bombs, and water
cannons to suppress the riots (see Photo 1). A former activist
reflected that in response to the riots “the government just put
in tough ‘bat-beaters’ [Military Police], people were beaten up
and even the routes to the hospitals were blocked.” (http://
wijnemenjemee.nl/nieuws visited 27-03-2017). Thus, many
protestors were injured and/or arrested, and the majority of
Amsterdam residents and Dutch citizens more generally who
were not involved in the riots supported or sympathized with
the protestors.
7. Project responses in the aftermath of the metro riots
After the riots, the ‘underground metro’ of Amsterdam
received a “reputation of violence, repression, mismanagement,
spatial disaster, economic tunnel vision, and fierce social,
political, and cultural opposition” (Verstraete, 2016: 85).
Though the project organization completed the East line despite
major resistance, there were several significant responses of
and practices used by project actors to deal with the despondent
and controversial aftermath of these riots. A major response
was that the minister publicly stated that after the completion ofrkt riots (taken by Hans Peter, 1975).
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including the North-South line plan which was already
formulated in the 1960s. Consequentially, after 1975, ‘the
metro’ in all its forms, even when merely verbalized, became
institutionalized as taboo in Amsterdam and the ‘economic
tunnel vision’ became deinstitutionalized (Soetenhorst, 2011;
Langstraat and Switzer, 2015). For example, related urban
renewal plans such as a new four-lane highway that would pass
through the city center (over the East line), and shop and office
complexes to be constructed (along the East line) were also
immediately discarded (Schoonberg, 2013; Langstraat and
Switzer, 2015).
Moreover, as a kind of symbolic ‘apology’ of the city
council to the local community, art work was exhibited at the
stations of the East line to memorialize the metro riots,
“dedicated to the violent history of the [Nieuwmarkt]
neighborhood” (Verstraete, 2016: 86). Examples include a
replication of a wrecking ball against a breaking wall of the
metro tunnel, memorializing the demolitions; a photograph of a
squatter in action during the demolitions displayed behind a
crumbling wall, to remember the protestors during the riots; and
graffiti, posters and poems made by activists which were also
demolished in 1975 but were replicated to be displayed as art in
the metro tunnel. In this sense, “ironically, the metro functions
as an archival place for conserving things it has destroyed”
(Verstraete, 2016: 88).8. Planning and implementing the North-South line in the
context of the metro taboo
Despite the controversial aftermath of the East line, the
North-South line project plan was never completely aban-
doned and secretly re-emerged behind-the-scenes in the late
1980s. According to Davids (2000), it wasn't until over a
decade later, in 1988, that the word ‘metro’ was included
again in discussions about urban development plans and it
was acknowledged that it would be extremely difficult to sell
these plans to the public. Because of the conflicted
institutional environment, project plans were discussed
internally to evade media attention and project sponsors still
used the term ‘tunnel-tram’ instead of metro to avoid breaking
the taboo (Langstraat and Switzer, 2015). The technical
director of the North-South line, largely responsible for the
project's commencement, shared his experience during this
time:
I started with the plan at the end of the 1980s. That was a
very difficult context, because the first experience with
building metros was bad […] This left deep traumas behind
in the city, among the state officials, the people, and to a
lesser extent the business. In this context we had to make
plans to improve the public transport of Amsterdam
(interview, former project director, 23-11-2012).
He went on to explain that despite the ensuing trauma of the
East line, the old plan of the North-South line kept resurfacingduring discussions about improving the Amsterdam public
transport because it remained “quite an addition to the system
with a major transport-related value.” Amsterdam was getting
busier with more and more inhabitants, tourists and car traffic,
and the tram net was more or less complete. Thus, an
underground metro constructed with new technology (as
opposed to the caisson-method) seemed like the only durable
way to improve the transport system and develop the
Amsterdam urban landscape without demolishing buildings
(Davids, 2000).
Engineers had found the necessary technical means to
construct the metro, particularly a soft subsoil tunnel boring
machine. This machine enables underground tunnel excava-
tion without the demolition of aboveground buildings, which
was the main issue to be avoided after the metro riots: “We
had a solution; we could do it underground” (interview,
technical director, 23-11-2012). In this way they hoped to
finally break the metro taboo. Slowly and silently, the new
metro line was pushed into a process of decision making in the
Amsterdam city council, which eventually approved the plan
in 1994 to initiate the phase of project definition and
preparation.
9. Community resistance against the North-South line
The promise of a technological solution didn't take away
public fears. On the contrary, the secretive behaviour of
administrators and the project organization roused distrust
among the city and triggered resistance anew. Apart from the
major financial costs, the biggest reason for resistance and
fear concerned the sinking of monumental buildings which
rest upon a foundation of stilts on which most of water-based
Amsterdam has been built (Mak, 2012). Many wondered how
the new metro stations, up to 40 m deep, could be constructed
and what would happen if the tunnel boring machine passed
the foundation poles and soggy underground of historic
buildings. Would the poles collapse, sink, or remain stable?
Due to this uncertainty and to prevent the project via legal
procedures, in 1997 an alliance of residents, state officials and
politicians was formed called ‘the Abovegrounders’. They
resisted the North-South line plans, claiming that the
foundation of buildings was not strong enough and that the
costs for construction would be too high for Amsterdam. The
opponents of the North-South line actually “won” the
referendum held to (dis)approve the metro line in 1997
(65% of the voters was against), but the outcome was
proclaimed invalid due to an insufficient total amount of
voters. “So we went on with the project” (interview, technical
director, 23-11-2012).
The project organization attempted to legitimize the
project, draw away citizens' fears, and subdue resistance by
claiming that “state-of-the art” underground construction
technology would have minimal risks and a high-tech system
would control the possible submergence of buildings. The
technical director, having the foremost authority in under-
ground construction in the Netherlands, had initiated several
test-runs for the tunnel boring machine technique between
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projects were selected by ‘Rijkswaterstaat’, a Dutch govern-
mental agency which manages transport and water infrastruc-
ture in the Netherlands. In that time Rijkswaterstaat was a
technically-oriented organization characterized as arrogant,
intrusive, and a bastion with a strong internal focus and
pragmatic logic when interacting with the environment
(Berendse, 2013). Consequently, the project organization
(still) highly valued an instrumental-rational perspective,
focussing on technically complex problems by perceiving
them as puzzles that have to be analysed and solved in
isolation.
The domination of technical values was also reflected in the
communication with local communities: ‘There dominated a
very black-white idea that the information you provided had to
be [technically] correct; if you didn't know something, you
didn't share it’ (Van der Kam, 2016: 47), meaning that
uncertainties were concealed from the public eye. Simulta-
neously, the project isolated itself from its environment:
‘Nobody knew exactly what was going on, causing project
actors to lose their grip on the situation and to retreat more and
more to the background’ (Van der Kam, 2016: 25).
Essentially, every technical mishap was met with rage because
the public was not honestly informed about the uncertainties,
risks, or prepared for the technical complications from the
start:
So, actually, I think because the curtains were so shut there
was a lot of distrust over the process […] they even
established a political party called ‘Save Amsterdam.’ Well,
the most important point for them was stopping the North-
South line, and especially the tunnel boring. Because if the
boring would proceed, then everything along the way
[would collapse according to them] (interview, communica-
tion advisor, 15-6-2012).
Despite substantial opposition from the local community
and varied reports, overall statistics and predictions of
technical experts provided sufficient legitimacy for the
Amsterdam city council to officially approve the implemen-
tation of the North-South line project on October 9, 2002 with
29 votes versus 14. At the time, the estimated costs were 1.46
billion euros with an expected delivery date in 2007
(Soetenhorst, 2011).10. When technology fails
In the preparatory construction phase (2003–2009) of the
North-South metro line, grave complications materialized
resulting in technical mishaps, major cost overruns, and time
delays (Soetenhorst, 2011). Most problems resulted from
leakages in the concrete dam walls of the new stations through
which earth water spilled into the excavation sites, causing the
submergence of roads, railways and buildings in those areas,
such as at Central Station, Damrak and Vijzelgracht. The
incidents at Vijzelgracht were by far the most critical, drawingheated attention from the public and the media. This is where
the first submergence took place in October 2004, causing
seven monumental buildings to sink 2.5 cm into the ground.
Later, in June 2008, four more buildings on this historic street
sank 15 cm into the ground. After attempting to resolve the
issue by freezing the ground or injecting it with a mixture of
grout to stop further submergence they continued construction
at the Vijzelgracht in September 2008. However, shortly after,
another six buildings sank up to 23 cm, resulting in the
evacuation of its residents.
As a result of these major setbacks, the preparatory
construction of the North-South line was temporarily shut
down while political discussions were held on whether to (dis)
continue the project. Evidence of the survey committee
appointed to analyse what went wrong and why, showed that
the concrete of the dam walls was of low quality, resulting in
weak spots and the ultimate leakages (Survey-Committee-
North/Southline, 2007). The committee concluded that “in
contrast to the political promises given, the city has suffered
from significant disruption because of the construction of the
North-South line” (Survey-Committee-North/Southline, 2007).
Nonetheless, the ultimate verdict was that terminating the
project was no longer an option; they in too deep. The
Amsterdam city council therefore decided to resume the
construction process. As a result of these major setbacks, the
costs tripled to over 3 billion in total, the delivery was delayed
to 2018, and the alderman of Amsterdam resigned (https://
wijnemenjemee.nl/tijdlijn/).
In this context, the city was heaving with contestation,
anger and distrust: “There were problems with trustworthi-
ness because it's all happening on the street, right in the
middle of the city” (interview, technical director, 12-11-
2012). However, the wound was much deeper than that
because it hadn't quite healed yet from the East line trauma.
With the ghost of the metro riots hovering above their heads,
the project organization tried to keep silent about the building
process and shut out the public, especially regarding
complications and mishaps. However, the societal and
environmental impacts of these mishaps were inevitable and
unavoidable:
There was a lot of suspicion. Our engineers had always
shouted ‘it's all state of the art and nothing will happen. We
make the road open once, cover it, and then we'll go
underground.’ Then things went wrong at the Vijzelgracht.
Then you really got this idea in Amsterdam, ‘well, they all
say that it's under control and all state of the art materials and
construction methods, but why does it go wrong?’ Yes, and
yet it goes wrong. Then the drillers came and then there was
a need to bring humanity back in (interview, communication
advisor, 15-6-2012).
In sum, the project organization was too technical in its
focus and practice, where engineers and technical experts took
the lead and attempted to keep the public at arm's length with
promising predictions and calculations. But when things went
wrong, the predictions had no more bearing which catalysed
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project had become a symbol of failures and mishaps”
(interview, communication director, 22-05-2012).11. Institutional work: project practices for gaining
legitimacy
According to project actors, the skeletons had to come out of
the closet, meaning that the project organization had to
drastically alter its external stakeholder communication strategy
and become more transparent towards the outside. Project
actors were generally too focused on the technical and physical
construction process while neglecting the communication and
collaboration with the local community in its wider
environment:
At the start, the project organization was only busy with the
project, autistic behaviour […] but we had to try to control
what happened at the construction sites. That is a big
undertaking, because you need a lot of collaboration from
the outside, and we did not predict well enough how much
we needed. It was not a given, and then we had a crisis […] I
got a new director and they started building a new
relationship with the environment (interview, technical
director, 12-11-2012).
Though the North-South line project continued despite
major setbacks and resistance, the institutional conflicts
between the project organization, the government and the
public gave way for a fundamental change in project
management thinking and practices in 2009–2010. As
newly appointed managers took over during this time, they
brought with them experiences from other (inter)national
projects where they had learned cultural change processes
were needed to gain legitimacy from affected stakeholders
(field observations, January 2009). In the case of the North-
South line, dominant cultural characteristics such as isola-
tion, distance, internal focus, research orientation, and
technical knowledge had to make way for environmental,
cultural, and societal sensitiveness and external stakeholder
inclusiveness:
We wanted to make a movement towards the repositioning
of the project, a project of engineers, researchers and
rationality and distance and more research and so on - and in
this positioning you saw that all faith had been lost from the
stakeholders of the city - so we said we have to go another
direction (interview, communication director, 22-05-2012).
According to the new project director the cultural change
worked because new norms and values, such as environmental
sensitiveness, inclusiveness and openness, were enacted from
within project organization; “They were not designed by
external consultants, that would never have had the same
results' (http://neerlandsdiep.nl/nieuws/ visited 12-05-2017).The new ‘open’ communication strategy was used to (re)
gain external trust and support for the project, by publicly
exhibiting the construction process via videos, photographs,
blogs and websites, and by providing the opportunity for
residents to visit the construction sites and to interact with
construction workers. The communication director explained
this approach:
After the submergence the project shut like an oyster […] so
we said a part of our new course is to open up, as much as
possible. It was a city project I always said, it needed to
become part of the city, to involve the city by opening up
the construction sites […] very transparently and realisti-
cally, to share the risks openly, to stop covering things up,
[to say] ‘it is what it is’, to tell that to the outside, to the press
(interview, communication director, 12-11-2012).
A key strategy to gain trust of Amsterdam locals was to
invite and involve them to see and experience the underground,
such as the tunnel, the stations and the machines, by making it
more visible and accessible. This was done in the form of open
days and project excursions, such as the annual ‘Day of
Construction’; a national and annual event during which
projects in the Netherlands engage citizens in their construction
process in which they could show their work and results: “This
is something very important, to keep people within the project
[…] we could show people what we were doing (interview,
technical director, 12-11-2014). Similarly, an underground
look-out tower was installed with a camera, so people could
observe the constructors live at work on the internet. Moreover,
manifold excursions were organized on a weekly basis to show
residents and other interested visitors a (new) object or phase of
construction:
We think that we must really show [the construction]. We
want to take residents to the building sites, so we have many
visits to the building sites, because we find this very
important, to show the neighbourhood, Amsterdam, but also
stakeholders, people with whom you cooperate (interview,
communication advisor, 7-08-2013).
Project actors adhered that by holding these participatory
events, societal support and legitimacy can be acquired
because such occasions enable residents to gain a better
perspective and understanding of the hindrance, disturbance or
problems caused by the construction process. By making the
construction sites accessible, residents can see, smell, hear and
feel what goes on underneath the ground whereas this is
usually invisible for them. The project organization also placed
a giant red 3D arrow aboveground with the portraits [and
names] of the tunnel borers, pointing down to show where the
builders were working underground at a certain time. When the
workers would move underground, the arrow would physically
follow them aboveground. The arrow reads; “Here we are
now!”According to the communication director, the arrow had
symbolic value because “this is the movement of the
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machine but the people in the machine (interview, communi-
cation director, 12-11-2012). Furthermore, the project used
virtual platforms in their attempt to absorb the resistance,
unrest, and criticisms:
On the Website we show very manifestly what kind of
criticism there is on this project, what happens on Twitter
you will see that on the homepage, we censor nothing,
everything can be said. Well, this is this new approach of
letting go, openness, realism, this is also really a value that
we name, and this comes back on there [the Website]
(interview, communication director, 12-11-2012).11.1. Ritualization as a mechanism for institutionalization
Another phenomenon that was observed in the research was
ritualization, involving the celebration of milestones and
(phase) transitions in the project process via ceremonial events,
such as signing contracts, (sub)project kick-offs and (sub)
project completions or deliveries. From our analyses, three
particular ritual events in the North-South line project had
important symbolic, communicative, and strategic functions to
help reshape the project's relationship with the environment and
to embed it in its social context. With these events the
communication team wanted to show “the magic”, “the heroes”
and the “beautiful machine” of the underground, as they
mentioned during interviews.
The North-South line project organization publicly per-
formed the official launch for the first two phases of tunnel
construction using tunnel boring machines on 11 March 2010,
during which the first two machines were baptized by a
Catholic priest and given female names, ‘Gravin’ and ‘Noortje
(in this case by Amsterdam school children), according to the
tradition of the tunnel construction workers. Subsequently, the
same rituals were performed to launch the last two phases of
tunnel construction for machine ‘Molly’ (28 April 2011), and
machine ‘Victoria’ (15 November 2011), that were also baptized
and bestowed their names to excavate the remainder of the tunnel.
According to a communication advisor, these events and
particularly the “humanization” of the four colossal tunnel boring
machines were important to (re)direct the attention of the public
away from technical mishaps and uncertainty towards the
craftsmanship and traditions of the tunnel workers:
To bring the craftsmanship to the forefront and [to show] the
experience of the people who do the actual work, then these
traditions [the rituals] are really suitable to show it. So, in
that way in terms of communication, it really fit well. It was
a very sympathetic ritual to bring the construction to the
forefront […] in terms of a milestone for this project, but
also a political statement, yes, in this sense the ritual had
much value (interview, communication advisor, 15-6-2012).
In sum, the project actors of the North-South line made use
of various creative practices and strategies, such as projectexcursions, open days, interactive virtual and physical
platforms, and the ritualization of important milestones in
the project process, to initiate and facilitate a transition from
a monolithic, internal and technically-oriented structure
towards a more transparent, external and human-directed
one.12. Shifting approaches to project management in the
Netherlands
To understand the abrupt cultural change and new project
management approach of the North-South line project organi-
zation, two developments in the institutional context of the
project have to be mentioned. First, in the period of 1960–2010,
community resistance was not only observed in the East line
and North-South line projects but in many other large-scale
infrastructure projects in the Netherlands. Therefore, discus-
sions regarding more societally-oriented approaches of infra-
structure projects started to emerge (Boelens, 2010). Public
organizations in the infrastructure sector realized managers and
practitioners needed to receive better training to implement
societally-oriented approaches. Hence, project managers work-
ing in the public domain were trained to become more sensitive
to communication, stakeholder management, and citizen
engagement, establishing a cohort of civil engineers with skills
to manage the societal environment.
Second, the institutional context of the in the North-South
project was also influenced by the outbreak of the Dutch
construction sector corruption scandal in 2004 (Priemus, 2004;
Sminia, 2011). For a long time, constructors arranged pre-
agreed prices for clients and thus sidestepped competition
(Graafland and Nijhof, 2007). This was also the case in the
North-South line in which constructors calculated prices 60%–
100% higher than calculated by the client (Survey-Committee-
North/Southline, 2007). The collusion scandal caused a crisis
between public clients and contractors and deinstitutionalized
tender practices in the construction sector (Priemus, 2004).
Public clients were forced to re-institutionalize the sector
according to new standards and codes of conduct. Engineers of
public clients had to change their role from technical experts to
supervisors of innovative collaborative arrangements
(Berendse, 2013) and engage in a process of reflection on
collaborative practices with contractors.
Taken together, the two studied subway project cases show
the increasingly significant role of cultural forces, manifest in
the community resistance and the changing responses, practices
and strategies of project actors over time. We encapsulate these
findings in the table below (see Table 1 to compare the East line
and North-South line).
Reflecting on the evolution of subway construction in
Amsterdam since the 1960s and comparing the East line and
North-South line, we can see particular similarities but also
differences in terms of how project actors aimed to acquire
legitimacy over time, in the context of institutional pressures
and conflicts as they evolved. These will be discussed in the
following section.
Table 1
A neo-institutional perspective the East line and North-South line.
Themes East line North-South line
Project planning [1960s – 1970s]
Legitimization based on administrative and top-down arguments
of modernization, urbanization, transport and business
Voice of community against demolition of neighbourhoods was
disregarded
[1980s – 1990s]
Legitimization based on urban development to accommodate rising
population and tourism Plan to build North-South line resurfaced
Plan was formulated ‘behind-the-scenes’ and excluded the local community
Project implementation [1970s – 1977s]
Legitimization based on economic and technical arguments
Government-oriented: use of top-down authority
Technically-oriented: neighbourhoods were demolished despite
major protests
Failed local embedding of project: voice of community not
taken into consideration, hiding from controversy over project
[1990s – 2010s]
Legitimization based on tunnel boring machine for new metro project
Technically-oriented: focus on engineering and ‘state of the art’ technology
Failed local embedding of project: hiding from discussions with community
Technological failures: buildings submerge between 2004 and 2008
Project was temporarily shut down in 2008
Community resistance [1970–1975]
Major controversy and resistance from Amsterdam community
Resistance organized in social movements to preserve historic
city centre
Resistance escalated to violent ‘metro riots’ in 1975
[2000 – 2010s]
Moderate to major controversy and resistance fromAmsterdam community
Resistance organized in political parties
General public unrest due to metro taboo, cost overruns, time delay,




Legitimization through oppressive regulation: use of military
police to counteract resistance
Hiding from public debate, continuing construction and
finishing the project
Declaring future metro-lines taboo Discarding other urban
infrastructure plans in Amsterdam
Memorializing resistance: activist-inspired art in the East line
metro stations
[2010s – present]
Legitimation through humanistic institutional work
Engaging in public debate, continuing construction and finishing the project
Embedding project in community through serious engagement with
environment
Practices and strategies for including and communicating with residents
through multimedia platforms, open-days, excursions, and ritual events
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Analysing our empirical findings concerning the project
cases of the East line and the North-South line from a neo-
institutional perspective, three main insights on the relation
between large-scale infrastructure projects and their institu-
tional environment come to light.
Firstly, the dynamic and recursive interrelation between the
two large-scale projects and their institutional context followed
similar processes. Legitimation for the planning and imple-
mentation of these projects was found in the need for urban
development, sustainable transport and economic growth, and
was acquired through political processes such as public
administrators planning the East-line in ‘back rooms’ in the
1960s or the referendum held to (dis)approve the North-South
line in the late 1990s. Both projects had a tendency to focus on
economic and instrumental elements to gain legitimacy and did
little to embed the projects in their local context, which
generated much social unrest and community resistance. Only
after community resistance turned into violent riots (East line)
or when technology failed (North-South line) were alternative
bases of legitimation sought after, focussing more on managing
the impact of these projects on the local community. These
findings correspond with earlier studies (Moulaert et al., 2003;
Ashokan, 2015; McAdam et al., 2010; McAdam, 2011; Scott
and Levitt, 2017; Di Maddaloni and Davis, 2018; Liu et al.,
2018) demonstrating that large-scale infrastructure projects are
inherently controversial, catalyzing institutional conflicts and
resistance from external stakeholders in the local community
which must be addressed sooner rather than later. In sum, thefirst insight of a neo-institutional perspective reveals that the
dynamic interplay between actors, organizations and the
institutional environment (Greenwood et al., 2008: 31) is an
ever-changing institutional process that is socially constructed
by the reproductive (inter)actions of diverse agents (Sydow and
Staber, 2002).
The second insight provided by the neo-institutional lens
showcases how in the dynamic and conflictual interface
between the studied projects and their institutional environ-
ment, a gradual institutional transformation was facilitated in
terms the approaches used by project actors to gain legitimacy
for the project at certain points in time. Specifically, we can
discern three main – what we call – ‘approaches of
institutionalization’ that have been used to legitimize the
projects; being an administrative, technocratic, and humanistic
approach of institutionalization.
According to an administrative approach government
authorities take the lead in investing in, devising and
implementing urban renewal plans with a strong economic
focus and a tendency to disregard the needs and interests of the
local community (Hanna et al., 2016). This framework was
especially dominant during the planning and implementation of
the East line (1960–1975) which abided by modernist planning
doctrines while virtually ignoring the voice of Amsterdam
residents and activists (Boelens, 2010; Verlaan, 2014); and in
the North-South line when the Amsterdam city council
approved the project despite substantial opposition. Liu et al.
(2018) remind us that the government's disregard for local
needs is significant in generating community resistance against
large-scale projects; a phenomenon that has been widely
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generally (e.g. Bourdieu and Nice, 1998; Smith, 2001; Çoban,
2004; Spierenburg et al., 2006; Obi, 2010).
In a technocratic approach, government elites take a back
seat and rely heavily on the discretion of engineers and
technical experts – i.e. a “technocratic, expert-based approach”
(McAdam et al., 2010: 407) - focussed on innovative
technological solutions and practices to legitimize construction,
such as the tunnel boring machine technique and “state of the
art technology” in the North-South line. While this approach
was used in the North-South line to avoid the demolition of
buildings and have minimum impact on the community (as was
the case in the East line), this approach typically does not
endorse the local embedment of projects in society as shown in
our research when project actors of both cases shut out the local
community and displayed oppressive (East line) or isolationist
(North-south line) behaviour to quell social unrest. The
dominance of such an approach has proven largely unsuccess-
ful and been criticized by numerous project scholars (e.g.
Engwall, 2003; Hodgson and Cicmil, 2006; e.g. Pollack, 2007;
Söderlund, 2004; Van Marrewijk, 2015; Morris and Geraldi,
2011), calling for a paradigmatic shift in project management
thinking.
Conversely, a humanistic approach is characterized by
attention of project actors to community needs and interests.
According to this paradigm, a project is perceived as deeply
embedded in social interactions and multiple contexts
(Manning, 2008), and project actors carry out extensive
institutional work to (re)shape the relationship between a
project and its environment. As such, this approach supports
the local embedment of the project through improved and
inclusive external stakeholder communication, and strategies
directed at the human dimension (Aaltonen, 2013; Ashokan,
2015; Di Maddaloni and Davis, 2018). Unfortunately, this
approach only emerged in the aftermath of the metro riots and
the East-line's troublesome completion in 1975, with the public
deinstitutionalization of ‘the metro’ which subsequently
became taboo, and the memorialization of the demolished
neighbourhoods through public art exhibited at the East line
stations. In the North-South line, this approach became more
prevalent after major technical mishaps, community resistance,
and the temporary shutdown of the North-South line at the end
of 2008, as project actors increasingly realized they needed to
legitimize the project by gaining public support and acceptance
from outside the project, being the Amsterdam community.
While all three approaches are situational and have been
used interchangeably in both project cases, our findings suggest
the administrative and technocratic approaches have been
dominant (1960–2008), lacking in terms of the social and
cultural skills needed to acknowledge, respond to, and
accommodate locals as important and influential external
stakeholders, encapsulated by the humanistic approach. We
do not wish to imply that the administrative and technocratic
approaches are necessarily ‘bad’ while the humanistic approach
is ‘good.’ Rather, an amalgamation and delicate balance
between all approaches is needed to legitimize the planning
and implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects.Particularly the humanistic approach, while traditionally
overlooked in the field of project management (Cicmil, 2006;
Pollack, 2007; Hodgson and Cicmil, 2007), has become
essential in recent decades, because “the public has become
increasingly educated, informed, and empowered” (Liu et al.,
2018: 613) and “community-based protests against major
construction and engineering projects are becoming increas-
ingly common” (Teo and Loosemore, 2014: 41). In this
context, we found evidence for how institutional conflicts and
pressures - in our case between project actors and local resistors
- can provide opportunities for institutional transformation
towards a more inclusive and humanistic approach, as called for
by others (McAdam, 2011; Teo and Loosemore, 2011; Di
Maddaloni and Davis, 2018). The phenomenon of resistance
generating opportunities for transformation has been theorized
in the field of organization science as ‘productive resistance’
(Courpasson et al., 2012), which requires further exploration in
the field of project management. In this spirit, we urge project
actors and scholars to perceive resistance as something
constructive and enlightening, rather than as something
detrimental that needs to be quelled.
The third main insight provided by a neo-institutional
perspective, and building upon the previous point, is the
importance of the institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2013)
project actors carry out in pursuit of legitimacy. While
institutional work was initially focused on economic and
technological factors to legitimize the subway projects, over
time it became more directed at managing social and cultural
impacts and dynamics. Project actors had to respond to the
belief systems and cultural schemas prevailing in the local
community, which demanded a more meaningful say in the
construction process. Local resistors went as far to organize
their cause and take collective action to exert influence on
project decision-making and proceedings, such as the social
movement organizations ‘Action-Group Nieuwmarkt’ and ‘the
Strong Arm’ (East line), and ‘the Abovegrounders’ and ‘Save
Amsterdam’ (North-South line). Though these movements
were unable to stop the construction of these projects, project
actors had learned from the traumas and violence experienced
during the East line that suppressing resistance was deemed
unacceptable by society, requiring a different approach. When a
technocratic approach did not suffice to mitigate resistance
either, major efforts were taken especially by the North-South
line project actors to step outside the technical tunnel vision and
break the metro taboo by bringing “humanity back in”, such as
by inviting and involving residents to visit the construction sites
during project excursions, open days and ritual events
(2008–2018). Thus, to respond to community resistance,
institutional work was required (though not always engaged
in) in the form more inclusive and societally-directed practices
to manage the institutional context of the project. Such
practices are gradually becoming established in the field of
project management on an international scale (Scott et al.,
2011; Scott and Levitt, 2017), where project actors are learning
to expect and respect local opposition, and to adapt their
management approaches, interventions, and decision-making
processes accordingly (Dewey and Davis, 2013). This is in line
343L. van den Ende, A. van Marrewijk / International Journal of Project Management 37 (2019) 331–346with the paradigm of “do no harm” which is the idea that large-
scale infrastructure projects should only proceed if their
negative side effects on society are negligible or significantly
mitigated (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Lehrer and Laidley,
2008).
From a more critical perspective, it can be argued that the
humanistic approach prescribing societally-oriented institu-
tional work comprises rhetorical strategies of legitimacy
(Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) that frame the project in
such a way “to inform and persuade an audience, to make
people believe that the project is necessary, that it is for the
benefit of society, that it will make for a better future, and that it
is worth the time, investment and societal and environmental
impact” (van den Ende, 2015: 160). This requires more
political, strategic, and carefully orchestrated forms of symbolic
communication (Carter et al., 2010; Kornberger and Carter,
2010; Kornberger, 2013) that are often elusive, visual, and
aesthetic (Meyer et al., 2013); such as the public art exhibitions
to memorialize the resistance against the East line, or the
experiential project excursions and open days where local
residents could witness being underground, walk through the
metro tunnel, and even touch the tunnel boring machines.
Similarly, ritualization emerged as an important symbolic
mechanism of institutionalization (Meyer and Scott, 1992;
Sillince and Barker, 2012; Islam, 2015; van den Ende and van
Marrewijk, 2017) when the tunnel boring machines were
publicly baptized and bestowed female names while tunnel
workers were depicted as “heroes of the underground” during
ritual events. Our analyses confirm ritual events are ‘symbolic
devices’ (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) that are used
strategically to gain legitimacy from external stakeholders,
epitomizing project organizations as systems of meaning
construction “which engage in politically motivated symbolic
acts and myth making in pursuit of legitimacy” (Brown, 1994:
681). Indeed, Meyer and Rowan (1977: 348–349) explain that
to become embedded in their environment, organizations must
“incorporate elements which are legitimated externally rather
than in terms of efficiency” and employ “ceremonial criteria of
worth” which attribute accreditation, appropriateness and
acceptance to the project (Scott et al., 2011). In sum, the
institutional work of organizing ritual events, project excur-
sions, open days, and other interactive platforms for external
stakeholders not only responds to external pressures from the
institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), but
serves to attribute certain meanings to a project that appeal to a
wider social audience and the media (van den Ende, 2015)
thereby shaping standards of what constitutes a legitimate
project within a particular environment (Scott and Levitt,
2017).
In light of the discussion above, the main implication of our
research is that institutionalization comprises the strategic
crafting of social and symbolic practices directed at influencing
and gaining the acceptance and support of affected stake-
holders; an increasingly important skill project actors need to
acquire legitimacy and to manage the fragmented institutional
environment of large-scale infrastructure projects. More
specifically, while approaches and practices ofinstitutionalization have transformed over the years, making
way for a more inclusive, humanistic, and societally-oriented
approach; this approach is simultaneously political and
strategic by framing and socially constructing the project to
acquire legitimacy. In this sense, managing the inter-institu-
tional environment of different stakeholders and constructing
the project in a socially acceptable way has become crucial in
contemporary projects (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Lehrer
and Laidley, 2008; Scott and Levitt, 2017). It follows that in the
21st century of democratic societies, project legitimation not
only depends the administrative authority and technological
expertise aimed at the financial and physical construction of
large-scale infrastructure projects, but increasingly more on the
institutional work directed at the social construction of such
projects.14. Conclusion
This paper applied a neo-institutional perspective to
investigate how project actors of two controversial infrastruc-
ture projects, the East line and the North-South line, aimed to
acquire legitimacy in the face of community resistance and,
thereby, attempted to embed these projects in the local
environment of Amsterdam. We chose a neo-institutional lens
to cast light on the social, cultural and political dynamics at
play and the role of local communities as important external
stakeholders in shaping organizational approaches and prac-
tices. Our study has shown how institutional conflicts between
project actors and the local community concerning subway
construction in Amsterdam since the 60s gradually facilitated
an institutional transformation, catalysed by the situational
necessity of institutional work to (re)shape the relation between
a project and its environment. Herein, this research demon-
strates not only the impact of the institutional environment on
project planning and implementation but also the agency of
project actors who socially construct the project and execute
institutional work in their efforts to gain legitimacy.
The contribution of our research is twofold. The first
theoretical contribution is the application of a neo-institutional
lens providing three main insights into (1) the dynamic and
recursive interrelation between large-scale infrastructure pro-
jects and their environment; (2) institutional change and
transformation emerging from the conflictual interface between
project actors and local resistors, and (3) the value of
institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2013) project actors carry
out in pursuit of legitimacy. Such a neo-institutional lens has
not yet been fully explored in project management studies
(Scott and Levitt, 2017; Geraldi and Söderlund, 2018;
Biesenthal et al., 2018). The second contribution is our
longitudinal empirical investigation, spanning over four
decades, to exhibit the contextual dialectic of resistance and
accommodation with an emphasis on shifting approaches of
institutionalization, the constant struggle to acquire legitimacy,
and the local embeddedness of projects, as asked for by
scholars (McAdam, 2011; Scott et al., 2011; Scott and Levitt,
2017).
344 L. van den Ende, A. van Marrewijk / International Journal of Project Management 37 (2019) 331–346The findings of this study may help to encourage project
actors to ‘open up’ their projects to local communities and
stakeholders. Managing large-scale infrastructure projects
should no longer be carried out behind fences, leaning on
state-of-the-art technology, and repressing or hiding from social
conflicts and resistance. Rather, constructing these projects,
especially in urban settings, requires innovative and creative
ways for gaining support and acceptance from external
stakeholders (Aaltonen and Kujala, 2010), for giving local
communities a more meaningful say in their construction and
operation (McAdam, 2011), and for absorbing their self-
induced shocks (Grabher and Thiel, 2014).
Future studies aiming to apply a neo-institutional lens
should take more seriously topics of agency, power and
conflict, and apply theories of productive resistance
(Courpasson et al., 2012) and strategy-making (Suddaby et
al., 2013) to shed more light on institutional change and
practices of institutional work. Moreover, the inclusion of
social movement theory can help to move beyond static
conceptions of institutions and to better understand dynamic
institutional processes (Greenwood et al., 2008). Finally, a
renewed focus on the local communities in which project
organizations operate and how communities influence intui-
tional work and processes is invaluable (Di Maddaloni and
Davis, 2018).References
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